Secret signs and signals that an ordinary person is not supposed to know about. Intelligence operations eavesdropping on submarine cable lines Command secret wire symbol publication

The symbol of the Apple company - an apple bitten on the right side - is one of the most recognizable around the world. This logo is surrounded by many rumors and mysteries. Many see in it a hint of the genius Newton (according to legend, he discovered the law of universal gravitation after an apple fell on the top of his head). Someone is inclined to see in the apple a symbol of the fall. One of the founders of Apple, the late Steve Jobs, has always dexterously avoided commenting on the logo. Why? Perhaps, as Tainy.info writes, he was afraid that if the real subtext of the symbol became known to the general public, the corporation could suffer multimillion-dollar losses ...

The Genius of Pure Mathematics

Few people know that the idol of Steve Jobs was the English mathematician Alan Turing. The brilliant scientist is sometimes called the "father of computer science and artificial intelligence." At 41, Turing, according to the official version, committed suicide by biting an apple stuffed with cyanide by himself. According to other sources, it was not a suicide, but a murder. Be that as it may, Alan was until recently considered a pariah in the scientific world because of his homosexual predilections. His fan Steve Jobs could not help but understand: Apple is actively entering the markets of states where sodomy is not held in high esteem. And therefore in every possible way evaded questions about the logo. He probably feared that the true meaning of a bitten apple might scare off buyers. This version is supported by at least the fact that only in 1998 the corporation's logo became monophonic, until that moment the apple was painted in rainbow colors (a symbol of the gay community).

How did Alan Turing earn respect from Steve Jobs and other "monsters" of modern cybernetics? Like many geniuses, Alan Turing, born in India in 1912, was a non-standard child. He was not interested in anything but mathematics. Alan's parents, having moved to England, tried to make a comprehensively gifted person out of the boy: against his will, he was sent to Sherborne Humanitarian School. By the age of 13, Alan, who was not even taught the basics of calculus at the institution, solved the most difficult mathematical problems in his mind, which confused his teachers. He was called the worst student in the class, and the director wrote in the description: "He will undoubtedly become a real problem for society."

After leaving school, Turing studied first at Cambridge College (where he entered only the second time), then in France and the USA. At the age of 23, he already defended his doctoral dissertation in mathematics, and after two years he developed the theory of "logical computers". In the future, Turing's "machines" will become an obligatory part of the curriculum for future cybernetics. The world owes Alan a lot of purely mathematical solutions.

How a scientist outplayed the Nazis

In 1939, the British War Department set a task for Alan: it was necessary to unravel the secret of the Enigma, a machine that German ciphers used to encode radio messages during naval and air operations. The scouts managed to get a copy of the Enigma, but they still could not read the intercepted German radio messages. Turing was asked to head the department of the British School of Codes and Cyphers, which was supposed to help solve this problem, and was given free rein.

Alan was seized by a real hunting passion. He invited several friends to the group - chess players and mathematicians. Rolling up their sleeves, these world's first, in modern terms, hackers got down to business. Partially "break" "Enigma" managed a year later. The British could now read more than half of the German ciphers. And in 1943, the Turing group "hacked" a more complex version of the Enigma - it was used by German submariners. The British command gained access to almost all the information exchanged between the Germans. This undoubtedly contributed to the success of the British fleet and, of course, reduced the loss of life tenfold. Britain deservedly appreciated Turing's contribution to the victory. He was awarded an order and included in the group involved in the development of computers.

1951 was a real triumph for Alan. One of the first computers in the world was launched in Manchester, and a scientist had a hand in its creation: he wrote the software. In the same year, Turing was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of London. In addition, he did not stop working for intelligence. Now he was engaged in the "Soviet" direction and was about to develop an algorithm for recognizing ciphertexts.

fatal injection

Everything collapsed when in 1952 Alan's apartment was robbed. Soon after, during the investigation, the police arrested the perpetrator. It turned out to be one of the friends of the scientist's lover. Yes, Turing had been a confirmed homosexual for many years (a fairly common phenomenon in the high society of Britain) and did not even really hide it. In those years in England sodomy was considered a criminal offense. In most cases, society turned a blind eye to "sins" of this kind. In order not to fall under the harsh hand of justice, it was only necessary to hide their unconventional orientation and not announce it publicly.

Alan Turing, contrary to all the norms in force in society, went for broke: he loudly declared himself a homosexual. However, the evidence, in addition to a frank confession, was more than enough: the police seized from the thief the intimate correspondence of the scientist, which he had with his many lovers over the course of a number of years. Is it any wonder that the society Turing challenged mercilessly cracked down on him?

The high-profile litigation dragged on for several months. The fate of the thief no longer interested anyone: Britain, with bated breath, wondered about the future of Alan. Will the law really punish a war hero, a leading decryptor, a world-famous scientist? The judge was adamant. Turing, according to the laws of the time, was offered a choice: two years in prison or chemical castration. Alan chose the latter and soon received an injection that made him permanently impotent. In addition, Turing was fired from the civil service, and was also banned from teaching at the University of Manchester. The scientist overnight practically lost his good name, and the meaning of life, and means of subsistence.

After some time, the team of teachers took Alan on bail, he was allowed to take up teaching again. However, the scientist's psyche was broken: until the end of his life he lived as a recluse, playing various board games. Alan was embarrassed to go out in public - from the injection of the drug, which included female hormones, his breasts began to grow.

"Forgive us, you deserve better"

And he didn't have long. On June 8, 1954, the scientist's body was found in his house. Nearby, on the night table, lay a bitten apple, which, as the examination later showed, was saturated with potassium cyanide. The official version says that Alan committed suicide, the unofficial version says that he was killed by envious people. True, none of the supporters of the version of violent death explains what was envious at that time: Turing was actually hounded, trampled and betrayed into official oblivion.

The good name of the scientist was returned much later. And bashful rumor assigned the main role in the creation of computers and software to the American professor Norbert Wiener, pushing the "non-standard" Turing into the background.

Steve Jobs, having made a bitten and rainbow-colored apple the logo of Apple Corporation, was decades ahead of official authorities. Only in 2009, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown called Turing "the loudest victim of homophobia" and said: "On behalf of the British government and all those who live at large thanks to Alan's contribution, I say in all sincerity: forgive us, you deserved much better."

Life around us is full of all kinds of signs and signals, we encounter them every day in different public places: on the streets, in transport, shopping centers, hospitals...
These signs and messages are often encrypted information, the true meaning of which only the initiate knows. So who are these secret messages addressed to and what are they for? BBC Future correspondent tried to find out.

"Inspector Sands, please go to the control room."- if you ever hear such an announcement at a railway station in the UK, don't be alarmed.
Even if from now on you will know that this is a coded message designed to notify the staff that an emergency has arisen in the station building.
Encryption in this case is necessary so that, without sowing panic among passengers, let professionals know about the problem, who can help in solving it.
The topic of cryptology within the shop floor and other communities has been brought up recently by users of the social news site Reddit, and thousands of examples have been given in the course of the ensuing discussion.

Not all secret ciphers are made up of letters and numbers. Some are pictograms that are not easy to notice for the uninitiated.

But what ciphers and codes really exist, and what kind of information is hidden from the public during an emergency and in other non-standard situations?
Let's start with hospitals. There, color codes are usually used as an alarm for employees.
A Canadian hospital recently published its list of indoor signs on the Internet. According to this list, red means fire; white reports aggression; black - about the threat of an explosion.
In addition, everywhere the medical staff uses euphemisms. It is said that in hospitals, doctors sometimes call the mortuary "pink house" - out of respect for the feelings of the relatives of a recently deceased patient.
Marine vessels have their own coding. For example, to alert the ship's crew of emergencies, an announcement is usually made over the loudspeaker, beginning with the words "Mr. Skylight" (a proper name derived from the English word "skylight", or "skylight" - approx. translator).
On the ferry "Estonia", when in the autumn of 1994 he was in distress on the way from Tallinn to Stockholm, the following was announced using a speakerphone: "Mr. Skylight, [you're expected] at one and two".

The ferry "Estonia" sank in the Baltic Sea on September 28, 1994; just before the disaster, a message was sounded on the ship for a certain Mr. Skylight

This encoded phrase was supposed to serve as a signal to action - the crew was instructed to urgently batten down the hatches to restore tightness in the hull compartments on the first and second decks.
However, the ship could not be saved, and out of 989 people on board, 852 died.
“As I understand it, there are good enough reasons for such messages to be encrypted,” says Paul Baker, a linguist at Lancaster University in the UK. “At the time of the transmission of the message, it is often not clear how the situation will develop.
However, not only various institutions and services are encrypted, but also all kinds of communities. This is evidenced, in particular, by the numerous examples from life that the participants in the discussion cited on the Reddit website.
Someone told about the employees of the store, who came up with all sorts of special expressions for secret communication, only they understood.
On several occasions, "PEBKAC" was mentioned, a derogatory English term used by computer scientists in relation to some unfortunate users who now and then report another system error. And the problem, according to IT-specialists, is the incompetence of these same users.
The abbreviation PEBKAC (or "Problem Exists Between Keyboard and Chair") just means that "Problem Exists Between Keyboard and Chair" (PIMKIK).
There are examples of jargon hidden from the layman in other professional communities.
So, BBC Trending reports on a secret expression used by researchers to exchange articles from scientific journals for free, the content of which is available only by subscription.

The "Eurion Constellation" consisting of rings appears on various currencies; this is what it looks like on a ten pound note

The formula “I can haz PDF” (in the spirit of the popular Internet meme “I can haz cheezburger”) is a hashtag with which any member of the scientific community can now tweet to colleagues, indicating the article he or she needs at the moment and the contact email address.
Those of the dedicated colleagues who have access to the material they are looking for receive the signal and share.
But people looking for a mate through dating sites use a special digital code (437737) if they want to secretly warn a potential partner about their infection.
On the telephone disk, where the letters correspond to the numbers, this number corresponds to the word "herpes" in its English spelling ("herpes"); however, all other sexually transmitted diseases are also included.

Cryptography in drawings

However, not all codes consist of letters and numbers. Some are pictograms, which, seemingly being in full view, should not be evident to the uninitiated.
In a BBC Future article last year, it was said that the design of many banknotes includes the so-called "Eurion constellation". This graphic mark, recognized by most duplicators, helps to protect paper money from copying.
We can also find many hidden pictographic symbols on the street. An interesting example is the so-called hoboglyphs.

These inconspicuous graffiti tags, called Hoboglyphs, are for the homeless and point to safe areas, water sources, give information about the police, and more.

This is a system of signs intended for people traveling in search of work and homeless vagrants.
Among other things, hoboglyphs can indicate the quality of water in a nearby spring or warn of the hostility of the owners of a house along the way.
It is said that graffiti gangs also develop their own closed system of symbols and cover the drawings of hostile groups with them.
Discover magazine provides several examples in its 2012 issues. Here are just a couple: "SS" means "South Side" ("South Side"), a faction within the famous graffiti gang of Indianapolis, in the USA; the letter "X", carelessly painted with red paint over other people's graffiti, is a symbol of disrespect.
According to Discover, special software helps police decipher secret graffiti automatically. Such programs are already available even as applications for smartphones.
And on city sidewalks around the world, you can find squiggles painted with spray paint that correspond to the system of conventional signs of builders and engineers.
Recently, an article on the BBC website revealed the meaning of several of these symbols used in the UK.
Different colors correspond to different types of cable or pipe. Blue indicates the water supply system; yellow refers to gas pipes and green refers to outdoor video cameras or data cables.
Secret coding of information in public places is used, of course, for a reason.

According to the sign system adopted in the construction industry, red means electricity; blue - water; green - video cameras or cable networks; white - telecommunication networks

It helps to maintain public order during an emergency, quickly and in an understandable form to provide specialists with the necessary technical information, in a delicate manner to warn representatives of certain social groups about a danger or an opportunity.
However, after you learn about the existence of all these ciphers, it is already difficult to get rid of the feeling that everything around has a conspiracy origin.
Even if we are talking about the transmission of purely practical, everyday information, some kind of conspiracy theory will inevitably come to mind.
It is not surprising, therefore, that this topic is one of the most beloved in social networks.
"People don't like secrets, do they?" says Baker.

Are you wondering where the symbols you see before your eyes every day come from - the Command key and the “beach ball of death”? I think it's interesting now. Therefore, I hasten to fill the vacuum in my mind with the help of Gizmodo and a little Wiki.

Command key

Picky Steve Jobs always complains about something. This is the only way things are done at Apple, and the Apple key is no exception. Jobs immediately disliked the apple symbol on the keyboard. His response to Mac developer Andy Hertzfeld, was: “There are too many apples here! This is ridiculous! We're throwing the Apple logo around in vain." And, of course, the bug was soon corrected, and that little square with loops that we know and love replaced the original Apple key.

So where did these loops come from? Artist Susan Kare found this symbol in an international sign directory. In Scandinavian countries, it is used to designate sights and cultural monuments. It is also the official road sign to attract tourists in Sweden (as a result, local poppy drivers call the key "Fornminne" - "monument of antiquity"). The symbol is also known as the "Gorgon Loop" (Gordon's loop) and "Saint John's Arm's" (Saint John's arms). Its origins date back to pre-Christian times.

SBBOD

Officially, the “spinning beach ball of death” or “spinning beach ball of death” (Spinning Beach Ball of Death or SBBOD) means problems for most Mac users, so the attitude towards it is far from rosy. The cursor first appeared in OS X to indicate a situation where the active application is not responding and the user must either force quit the program or wait.

Before the ball, as many people know, there were wristwatches in Mac OS 9. The rainbow ball became its natural extension. But where does it originate from? In NeXTstep, the predecessor of OS X, this cursor was shaped like an optical disk. The ball was supposed to serve as a symbol for the removable and rewritable magneto-optical disks of the NEXT computers. However, regardless of the origins of the "yule of death", we still tense up at the sight of this cursor.

The idea of ​​listening to Soviet submarine cable lines was first conceived in late 1970 by James Bradley, head of the U.S. Naval Intelligence Directorate's Underwater Operations Division. Perhaps this idea came to him when he got acquainted with the experience of German submarines during the Second World War in listening to transatlantic cables, or, perhaps, when carefully studying the navigation charts of the seas adjacent to the Soviet coast, which indicated areas prohibited for trawling fish, or maybe because of other reasons. But be that as it may, it was Bradley who suggested using the Khelibat nuclear submarine for these purposes, which brilliantly coped with the discovery of the sunken Soviet submarine K-129 before that. He chose the Sea of ​​Okhotsk as an area where this problem could initially be successfully solved. Here, according to his calculations, a telephone cable was supposed to run, connecting the base of missile submarines in the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky region with the mainland, with the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok and Moscow. According to him, as he believed, information about plans for the use of submarines, missile firing and combat training tasks, information about nuclear arsenals, a system for providing and servicing missile carriers, etc., was to be transmitted. All this data was of exceptional value to US naval intelligence. Another attraction for the American side was the fact that undersea cable communication lines were supposed to transmit mostly unclassified or relatively low cryptographic strength information.

Initially, Bradley's department considered three areas where there was the greatest likelihood of laying submarine military communications cables and where it was possible to connect to them using submarines: the Baltic, Barents and Okhotsk Seas. Preference was given to the last of the three areas, since Kamchatka had one of the largest strategic missile submarine bases in the Navy, it was most isolated from the main command authorities on the mainland, and in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk one could expect the least opposition from the anti-submarine forces of the Soviet side.

Submarine "Khalibat"

At the same time, along with the obvious temptation of the idea proposed by Bradley, it was accompanied by a number of factors that could significantly complicate its implementation.

First of all, how on the bottom of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk - a total area of ​​611,000 square miles - to find a cable with a thickness, as expected, no more than 13 centimeters? The problem is intractable, but solvable. Solvable with another brilliant idea from Bradley. Remembering how as a child, sailing along the Mississippi River, he saw warning signs on its banks "Cable. Do not drop anchors!", Bradley suggested looking for similar signs on the coast of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. Having found them at a certain point on the coast with the help of a boat periscope, then it will be possible to significantly limit the subsequent search area for the cable on the seabed.

It was also necessary to take into account the factor that the connection to the submarine cable was supposed to be at depths of 100-130 meters, and this is not safe for submarine divers who make it without the appropriate equipment. The solution to this problem was also found by creating special diving equipment and equipping the Khalibat submarine with a special decompression chamber during the modernization.

There was also a negative experience of American submarines searching for what was supposed to be a Soviet cable hydrophone system off the island of Sicily in the early 1970s. This operation was carried out according to and under the patronage of Bradley's department, which believed that the Soviets had deployed a sonar surveillance system similar to the American SOSUS in the Mediterranean. Several reconnaissance campaigns by American submarines were unsuccessful. And only in the last campaign, in which the nuclear submarine Seahorse and the ultra-small submarine NR-1 participated, was the object of so much effort discovered, but it turned out to be an Italian telephone cable abandoned since the Second World War. The consequences for naval intelligence and, in particular, for the authority of the Bradley department, from the leadership of the US Navy after this fiasco were very tangible. However, the correct conclusions were drawn from this negative result, and not without benefit for subsequent reconnaissance operations under water.

And the last. It was necessary to convince the command of the Navy, as well as the top military-political leadership of the United States, of the expediency and necessity of this most complex, expensive and very risky operation to connect to the Soviet submarine communications line. After all, it was about the property of another country, unauthorized access to its "holy of holies" - a state secret with a possible violation of territorial waters. This could lead to far-reaching dangerous consequences, including large human casualties.

First of all, Bradley reported his plan to his immediate superior, Rear Admiral Hallfinger, head of the Naval Intelligence Directorate, and then to Admiral Zamwalt, chief of staff of the US Navy, and enlisted their support. Only one other person in the highest echelons of the Navy command, in addition to the indicated persons, was informed about the upcoming top-secret operation - the commander of the submarine forces of the US Pacific Fleet.

About his plans, Bradley was also forced to inform another super-secret organization - the National Underwater Intelligence Center. This center had a double departmental subordination - to the command of the Navy and the CIA. He oversaw the most complex and risky operations of the American submarine forces. With the help of this center and the CIA, Bradley hoped to achieve large appropriations for the very expensive operation he had conceived.

Here we should make a small digression.

Around the same time, the CIA, independently of naval intelligence, also became interested in the region. Ray Boyle, one of the best analysts of the CIA's Strategic Research Department, drew attention to a seemingly insignificant fact cited in one of the intelligence reports. It said that on Soviet navigational charts of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk marked "For Official Use", which were intended for captains and navigators of fishing vessels, the mouth of Shelikhov Bay between the Kamchatka Peninsula and the mainland was declared forbidden for trawling and fishing. Usually such measures were taken when some kind of underwater work was carried out in the area, for example, the laying of a pipeline. But a careful study of various reference and information literature did not confirm this version. Then it was decided to make a detailed aerospace photographic reconnaissance of the suspicious area.

Photo-space reconnaissance images obtained some time later gave unexpected results. On the coast of the peninsula and the mainland in this area, no traces of engineering and earthworks were found. However, something else was established: from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky on the eastern coast of the peninsula to Palana on the western coast, an underground communications line was laid relatively recently, which broke off before reaching the coast of the bay. To clarify the information received, it was decided to use an undercover source in Kamchatka. But here the specialists from Langley were in for a failure - communication with the source was lost. Representatives of the strategic research department did not despair and again began to analyze and summarize all available information on this issue. The determining factors in the formation of the final version of the analysts were the following: the presence of a basing point for Soviet strategic missile submarines in Krasheninnikov Bay near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, the Kura Combat Field in the northeastern part of the peninsula, designed to provide firing of intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as an underground communications line connecting Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky with the western coast of the peninsula. With this in mind, it was concluded that an underwater communication cable was laid along the bottom of the mouth of the Shelikhov Bay in the Sea of ​​​​Okhotsk, and important military information, including those related to tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles, can be transmitted through it. A detailed report containing all the information on this issue and the rationale for the final conclusion was submitted to the Director of the US CIA.

It should be noted that relations between members of the US intelligence community have always been difficult, and this was especially true of the CIA and DIA. (Let's recall the story of the recovery of the sunken Soviet submarine K-129.) Tough competition between them, sometimes "on the verge of a foul", often led to the fact that in these departments they could deal with the same issue without knowing about it and without informing each other. So it was in this particular case: the representative of naval intelligence, Bradley, did not know what the "Ceraushnik" Boyle was doing, and vice versa. Information on this super-important problem, for the reasons indicated, could only be found at the very top of the hierarchical service ladder, but even there it was used mainly from the point of view of departmental interests.

Now, after many years, the CIA, DIA, and naval intelligence are trying, at first glance, to unobtrusively present their own version that it was their organization that initiated and implemented this, one of the most successful, as they believe, American intelligence operations. But for us, this is not the main thing, but the evidence that the idea was nevertheless born and it had to be translated into reality.

So, for Bradley, the most important thing now remained - to convince the assistant to the President of the United States for national security Kissinger and his chief military adviser, General Haig. It depended on these key figures in American politics whether and how the proposed operation would be approved at all.

At that time, all covert operations carried out abroad were considered in the so-called "Committee of 40". Its members included the director of the CIA, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, and other senior officials of the US government and Congress. After the capture of the American intelligence ship "Pueblo"39, the meetings of this committee were to consider all foreign intelligence operations, including the most routine ones: CIA operations in the countries of the "third world", listening to government communications in the Kremlin, the actions of American submarines in the coastal waters of the USSR, flights of reconnaissance aircraft over the territory of other countries, etc. Members of this commission previously considered and made recommendations on the possibility of approving this or that operation. The chairman of the "Committee of 40" was Kissinger, on whom it depended how this or that issue would be reported and what procedure would be chosen for its approval. In a number of cases, Kissinger could coordinate this or that operation over the phone, and sometimes he took full responsibility for certain actions.

Bradley secretly hoped for such an option when he preliminary reported his plan to Kissinger and Haig. Most of all, he was worried about possible questions from members of the commission about the acceptable degree of risk in this operation. Since, for example, in order to search for the previously mentioned navigational signs on the Soviet coast, a submarine would need to enter three-mile territorial waters, which was a generally recognized violation of the sovereignty of another state, which could lead to very dangerous consequences for the American side. But Bradley's report was so convincing that Kissinger decided to take responsibility and, bypassing the members of the "Committee of 40", personally report to President Nixon about the need for such an operation.

So, the path for the Khelibat nuclear submarine to sail into the Sea of ​​Okhotsk was open.

"Halibat" in a new role

At the end of the summer of 1971, repairs and re-equipment were being completed on the Khalibat submarine for its new mission. In addition to her numerous special equipment, a DSRV deep-sea rescue vehicle was installed on the hull of the boat. However, this apparatus was intended to be used not in accordance with its main purpose, but to ensure the work of divers at great depths as a decompression and lock chamber.

In October, "Khelibat" left the Mare Island base and headed for the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. The passage was carried out north of the Aleutian Islands through the Bering Sea in order to avoid unnecessary contacts with Soviet ships. Any nuclear submarine would have covered this route in less than two weeks, but the Khalibat spent more than a month on it. Her onboard reactor of the 50s did not allow her to reach speeds of more than 13 knots, and the device located on the upper deck slowed her down even more and reduced her speed to 10 knots.

Getting directly into the Sea of ​​Okhotsk was also a very difficult task. The submarine maneuvered along the coastal fairway between the northernmost island of the Kuril chain and the southern tip of Kamchatka for several hours. But the divers were rewarded for their long torment with a beautiful view of the active volcano on the coast of the peninsula that opened up to them through the periscope.

Now they could begin their main task, for which they had come here - the search for an underwater cable. Meanwhile, it should be noted that a very limited part of the crew knew about the main purpose of the visit to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk: the commander of the boat Commander McNish, some officers, divers and representatives of the "special projects team" (in other words, "cave dwellers"), who were responsible for reconnaissance and technical support of the operation.

The submarine was constantly at periscope depth, visually surveying the coast of the peninsula in search of special navigational signs. In addition, every three hours she was forced to turn back on her course: it was necessary to make sure that there was no tracking of her by a Soviet anti-submarine submarine. This went on for more than a week, until a sign was finally found in the northern part of the Sea of ​​​​Okhotsk on one of the coastlines, warning of the need to be careful in connection with the presence of a cable here.

After that, it was possible to proceed to the underwater part of the operation. A remote-controlled device equipped with a television camera and a searchlight was fired from the submarine. The operators, being on board the boat, on the monitor screens could observe the underwater situation recorded by the TV camera. But then some strange marks appeared on the screen in the form of dark mounds on the seabed, repeating with a certain frequency. Visibility under water was not very good, so it was not possible to unambiguously classify the obtained images. Only after special processing of the received film in the laboratory on board, analysis of the color photographs taken, did the staff photographer and a representative of the "special projects team" come to the conclusion that a submarine cable had been found.

The commander of the Khalibat checked the submarine's location to see if they were in a three-mile restricted zone off the coast. The boat moved even further to the west, and at a distance of about 40 miles from the coast, a suitable place was found for placing the Khalibat on underwater anchors directly above the cable running along the bottom. A decompression chamber with divers on board was lowered to the bottom.

The divers attached a special recording device to the cable, about three feet long. The recording equipment of this device could record messages and signals transmitted through various channels for several days. Such a period of his work was provided by the lithium battery in it. After the connection of the listening device to the cable was completed, the electronic intelligence specialists on board the boat were able to personally listen to the transmitted information and make sure that the equipment was working.

So, the main part of the operation was carried out successfully. Moreover, everything went so quickly and smoothly that the overwhelming majority of the crew were firmly convinced that the discovery of the Russian submarine cable was accidental. After all, the official legend for them was the trip of a submarine to search for a new Soviet anti-ship missile that sank during testing. Such a task was also set for "Khalibat", but it was not the main one. With the help of an onboard sonar and an underwater television camera, the place where the missile fell was soon discovered, and the divers filled the gondola, which was specially attached to the hull of the boat, with its fragments. After that, "Halibat" headed for the US coast to its home base. Three months later, she moored to her native pier in Mare Island.

Upon arrival, the received recordings were transferred to the National Security Agency for decryption, and the fragments of the Soviet rocket lifted from the bottom were sent to the secret laboratory of the Ministry of Energy. Later, an answer was received from the National Security Agency that the submitted records did contain very valuable intelligence information: negotiations between the command of the strategic submarine base and the leadership of the Soviet Navy. Moreover, a significant part of the information was not encoded or its decoding was not particularly difficult.

Installation of a new "cocoon"

Meanwhile, Bradley was thinking about the future prospects of operations to tap the Soviet cable lines. The device, which was attached to a cable in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, could only register signals in a few channels and record them for a relatively short period of time. Bradley also dreamed that the interception was carried out on almost all channels of the communication cable and for several months. This would make it unnecessary to keep the submarine in the area of ​​the cable line and would make it possible to implement a more acceptable option for periodically returning the boat to the area to collect the accumulated information.

In order to implement the ideas of their boss, representatives of the underwater operations department instructed one of the laboratories of the Bell company to develop a much more efficient device. The new device was in the form of a cylinder (the Americans called it a "cocoon"), more than six meters long and about a meter wide, and weighed about six tons. It was equipped with a nuclear power plant. The electronic equipment in it made it possible to intercept enemy messages over dozens of communication lines and record them for several months. Unlike the previous device, it was not attached directly to the cable, but was placed next to it, using the induction effect for its work. Thus, according to American experts, the process of interception of intelligence information from a legal point of view did not violate the norms of international law.

By August 1972, the development of a new device was completed, and "Khelibat" set off on her second trip to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. This time the submarine cable was found almost immediately. With the help of divers, the listening device was placed at the bottom next to the cable route, and electronic intelligence specialists made sure that it was functioning normally and was intercepting intelligence information. More than a week "Helibat" was in the area and only then went to the base point on the islands of Guam, in order to return again in a month to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk to collect the accumulated information.

At the final stage of the campaign, when the divers began to work on extracting the cassettes with records from the "cocoon", something unexpected happened. Well, it couldn't be that such a risky and highly complex operation over a long period of time went so smoothly. A storm broke out in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. The excitement on the surface of the sea was so great that the "Khelibat", located at a considerable depth, was thrown up and down. As a result, the anchor chains could not withstand the stress and burst, and the boat began to float to the surface, but since the divers working at the bottom with the "cocoon" were connected by hoses to the submarine's hull, she dragged them up with her. Such a sharp change in depth for divers is detrimental, it can lead to decompression sickness. Only thanks to the vigilance of the watch service of the submarine, the ascent was stopped in time, the divers were placed in a decompression chamber and thus saved.

The information delivered by "Halibat" to the continent, and this time was extremely highly appreciated by the experts of the NSA. It contained data on the operational and tactical plans for the use of missile submarines, on the problems of their maintenance and combat training, measures to reduce noise, the time of arrival and departure of crews for combat service, the political and moral state of personnel, etc. At the same time, the hopes of American intelligence officers to obtain the information they needed about the results of launches of sea- and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in the area of ​​Kamchatka and the Sea of ​​Okhotsk did not come true. But in general, in the relevant intelligence circles of the US Navy and NSA, this source of information was unofficially referred to as a "gold mine".

Trips to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk to listen to the cable communication line have become regular. The NSA even gave these operations the code name "Ivy bells" ("Bindweed" or "Ivy Bells"). Mistakes were taken into account and conclusions were drawn from past lessons. Firm "Bell" received orders for further improvement of the listening device. And the submarine "Helibat" in 1974 and 1975 made trips to the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bOkhotsk already with special devices on the hull like skis - "skegs", which allowed her to gently land on the ground and not resort to the help of anchors.

Replaced comes "Sivulf"

At the end of 1975, the Khelibat submarine, having served its due date, was withdrawn from the fleet due to its age. But, nevertheless, the operation "Bindweed", in view of its extreme importance and effectiveness, should not have been interrupted. The leadership of the US Navy decided to involve the nuclear submarine "Sivulf" to participate in the operation. At that time, the Seawolf was not the most modern boat, for about 20 years it had been operating as part of the Navy, and since 1968 it was used only as a research boat. Therefore, its nuclear power plant and most of the equipment were relatively obsolete. However, despite this, significant funds were allocated for its modernization in the interests of carrying out operations to listen to submarine cable lines.

In 1976 and 1977, the Sivulf made two campaigns under the plan of Operation Bindweed in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. At the same time, the crew of the submarine faced two significant problems.

Submarine Seawolf

The first was associated with the high noise of the boat, because it was built, as already noted, at the dawn of nuclear submarine shipbuilding. American experts recognized her as one of the noisiest submarines in the US Navy. The leadership of the Navy took unprecedented measures to ensure the secrecy of navigation, the inadmissibility of detection by Soviet anti-submarine forces, given the special delicacy of the Seawolf mission in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. She was covered, as a rule, by at least two nuclear submarines. One, in its interests, carried out a search for enemy anti-submarine forces on the approaches to the Sea of ​​​​Okhotsk, and the second checked the presence of tracking the "Sivulf" by a Soviet submarine. If necessary, the second boat was supposed to distract the tracking Soviet submarine and take it away.

The second group of problems was related to the long service life of the Seawolf materiel and, accordingly, the low technical reliability of its equipment. During the sailing period of the boat, there were frequent breakdowns of the material part, fires, malfunctions in the air conditioning system on board and in the operation of the reactor. Especially great trouble threatened the crew when this happened directly in the performance of the task in the area where the Soviet submarine cable was located.

However, despite these difficulties, the Seawolf crew successfully coped with the difficult tasks of navigation and delivered valuable intelligence data to the shore.

From Okhotsk to Barents...

In the late 1970s, American naval intelligence made an assumption about a change in the Soviet concept of using naval strategic nuclear forces, which was associated with the entry into service of the Soviet Navy of new Delta-class submarines with a missile firing range of about 8,000 kilometers. With this range, Delta-class submarines could fire ballistic missiles from the Barents and other Arctic seas under the cover of their forces, practically out of reach of most American anti-submarine warfare systems. This circumstance greatly disturbed the American military-political leadership. Intelligence data was urgently needed to confirm the changes in the views of the Soviet military command on the use of sea-based strategic nuclear forces, as well as information about the nature and tactics of Soviet submarine operations in new, unconventional areas for Russians and Americans.

Leading US naval intelligence experts believed that the most complete and reliable information on these strategically important issues could be obtained mainly by listening to Soviet cable communication lines in the Barents Sea, on the coast of which the main bases of Delta-class missile submarines were located.

There was another carefully concealed reason for the need for such a reconnaissance operation. Recently, the American command has begun to worry about the increasing cases of tracking by Soviet submarines of American ones, the appearance of Russian reconnaissance forces in the areas of NATO exercises even before the arrival of the Allied navies there. There were also cases of Soviet reconnaissance ships appearing in the planned areas for the exercises, although they were canceled at the last moment. The American side was also very alarmed by the sharply changed emphasis in the construction of Soviet submarines from quantitative to qualitative characteristics. In particular, the Soviet side "suddenly" realized the critical role of submarine noise in dueling situations under water and began building fundamentally new multi-purpose boats of the Victor III type (Project 671rtm), which are not inferior to American ones in terms of noise. All this aroused suspicion and concern among the Americans: whether there was a leak of information at the strategic level. Have the Russians discovered the secrets so carefully guarded of coding information transmitted over communication lines? Or maybe carefully concealed Soviet agents are successfully operating in the "holy of holies" of the governing bodies of the American armed forces? Answers to these questions could, to a certain extent, be obtained by listening to those Russian lines of communication, access to which, as they believed, was not available to the opposing side.

These circumstances predetermined the need for a top-secret meeting, which took place in the "situation" room of the White House, chaired by US President Carter in the spring of 1978. In addition to the leadership of American naval intelligence, headed by its chief, Rear Admiral Inman, who reported on the essence of the problem, it was also attended by Vice President Mondale, Chief of Staff Jordan, Secretary of State Vance, CIA Director Turner, Secretary of Defense Brown. Carter listened with great interest to the reports of intelligence specialists and approved their plans for a reconnaissance operation in the Barents Sea related to listening to an underwater cable communication line.

Thus, the next stage of the "Bindweed" operation was launched in a completely different region, where the risk in its implementation was incommensurably higher. Taking into account the intensive activity of the Soviet anti-submarine forces in this area, the assumed need to enter not only the 12-mile zone of Soviet territorial waters, but also the internationally recognized 3-mile waters, the Khelibat and Sivulf submarines could not successfully cope with the solution of the task due to their age and high noise. It was necessary to attract a submarine of one of the latest projects with high tactical and technical characteristics, equipped with the most modern reconnaissance equipment. The choice of the American command fell on the nuclear submarine Purch. It was one of the newest Sturgeon-class submarines at that time, nine of which were specially built for reconnaissance missions. By the way, among them, for example, were the Archerfish, W. Bates and Batfish submarines, which repeatedly received various awards and prizes for successfully resolving reconnaissance tasks off the Soviet sea coast. The Purch submarine, in addition to the reconnaissance equipment already on board, was equipped for its new mission with special equipment for installing and maintaining modernized listening devices.

However, the Purch made its first reconnaissance trip not in the Barents Sea, but in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. This was necessary in order for the crew of the boat to receive the necessary practice in solving risky and responsible tasks, as well as to test the reliability and effectiveness of reconnaissance equipment. The submarine successfully coped with the task, gaining the required experience before the next, immeasurably more risky event.

"Purch" opens a new route

There was one serious limitation that affected the next trip of the submarine "Purch". Its entry into the sea could take place only after the completion of the Soviet-American negotiations at the highest level on the limitation of strategic arms. After all, the slightest mistake in carrying out a task could have a most serious impact on Soviet-American relations. Finally, on June 18, 1979, the SALT-2 treaty was signed by US President Carter and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Brezhnev. The way to the Barents Sea for "Perch" was open.

Given the particular delicacy and riskiness of the upcoming mission, a very unusual route was chosen for the Purch to the destination area. From her home base at Mare Island, she was to proceed north of San Francisco, then past Alaska through the shallow Bering Strait and across the North Pole, into the Barents Sea. As suggested by American experts, it was this route that was supposed to provide the greatest secrecy of the actions of the submarine.

Submarine "Perch" (Perch)

Unprecedented secrecy measures were taken for Purch, even more stringent than for Halibat and Seawolf. The vast majority of the Perch crew believed that the main task of the boat was to master a new route for submarines to the Barents Sea to conduct anti-submarine operations there. The boat was equipped with a special room in the torpedo compartment for a special group of increased composition, designed to conduct electronic intelligence and ensure the use of a listening device. Therefore, the supply of torpedoes on the boat was extremely reduced: only four torpedoes were left for self-defense in case of unforeseen circumstances. Taking into account the same circumstances, on board the boat, however, in the same way as earlier on the "Khelibat" and "Sivulf", 70 kilograms of explosives were placed for self-detonation. The submarine, like some other Sturgeon-class reconnaissance ships, was equipped to navigate in ice conditions.

Only at the end of August 1979, the submarine "Purch" left the base and headed for the Barents Sea. Of particular difficulty in carrying out this task was not only the unusual crossing route (especially through the Bering Strait), but also the search for a Soviet submarine cable in vast areas off the coast, in conditions of intensive shipping and enemy anti-submarine activity. Initially, it was assumed that the cable communication line should run from the Kola Bay along the coast of the peninsula to the White Sea, where the largest center for the construction and repair of Soviet submarines in the North was located. Taking this into account, the boat commander decided to concentrate the main efforts to find the cable at the exit from the White Sea, where the probability of its passage was the greatest.

Finally, with the help of technologies already worked out earlier, an underwater cable was discovered, and a listening device was installed on the bottom next to it. For two weeks, the submarine was in the cable area, as the electronic intelligence specialists on board had to make sure that the "cocoon" was functioning properly, carefully analyze the information passing through the cable, and select the most informative channels. And only after that, "Purch" could leave the destination area and report to the leadership on the completion of the task. Due to the extreme secrecy of the mission, the signal about its completion was transmitted not on radio frequencies common to American submarines, but on those used by the Soviets to reduce the likelihood of its radio interception by Soviet intelligence. After that, the signal was also transmitted to the end of the operation to the second American boat, which provided the operations of the "Purch" and was mainly intended to divert the Soviet anti-submarine forces.

The results of the assignment by the submarine "Purch" were considered very successful. Given their special significance, the crew of the submarine was thanked by a special decree of the President of the United States. In particular, it noted "the exceptional heroism and outstanding successes of the personnel of the submarine in the performance of a special mission of extreme importance for the national security of the United States .." Each member of the crew was solemnly presented with a personalized certificate with the specified text, certified by the seal of the President of the United States and personally signed by Carter.

"Cocoons" found

At the beginning of 1980, Purch, according to the plan, was supposed to make a trip to the Barents Sea to collect intelligence information from a listening device, and Sivulf to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. However, the unforeseen happened: a fire broke out on the Seawolf while working out the tasks of pre-season training at sea. The submarine was docked for repairs, and the Purch, after returning from a campaign in the summer, is heading for the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. At the same time, she also enters the Barents Sea to install another "cocoon".

When the new President Reagan came to power in the United States, the results and plans of the most important intelligence operations abroad were reported to him for approval. The reconnaissance operations of American submarines off the coast of the USSR were among such high-priority and secret operations. In March 1981, Rear Admiral Butts, the new head of the Naval Intelligence Directorate, was heard on this issue by President Reagan. And this time, the meeting in the "situation" room of the White House, given its special importance, was attended by the most influential political and military figures in the state: Vice President Bush, Assistant to the President for National Security Allen, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Baker, Secretary of the Navy Lemon, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy Watkins. Reagan was very interested in reports from the leadership of the US Navy about the growing power of the Navy of the Soviet Union, the importance of reconnaissance operations of submarines in Russian coastal waters. He unconditionally supported them and gave full carte blanche to the next stage of their implementation.

The command of the Navy, supported in its aspirations by the top military-political leadership of the state, already in 1981 provided for the simultaneous dispatch of two special-purpose submarines under the plan of operation "Bindweed" to the Barents and Okhotsk Seas. But if "Purch" and this time successfully completed the task, then "Sivulf", as if justifying its eternal bad luck, faced serious problems in its implementation. So, while in the destination area, the submarine commander did not maneuver very well when landing on the ground, and the boat fell on the underwater cable with its "skegs", which presumably could damage it. And this, in turn, could force the Soviet side to check the serviceability of the cable and lead to the detection of a listening device. In addition, the storm that broke out, like last time, almost led to the death of divers. When surfacing, the submarine with great difficulty broke away from the ground and escaped from the "sand captivity", since its "skegs" were covered with a significant layer of sand. The sand also penetrated most of the onboard systems and mechanisms of the ship, which significantly hampered their work, and serious problems arose with the operation of the reactor. And, finally, when returning to the base, the submarine could possibly have been detected by a Soviet surface ship.

The fact that the Seawolf submarine had landed on a Soviet submarine cable seriously worried the leadership of American naval intelligence. After all, this could lead to the failure of the entire operation "Bindweed".

And soon what the Americans feared so much happened. In one of the photographs taken with the help of space reconnaissance, American specialists discovered a large concentration of Soviet ships in the very area of ​​​​the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bOkhotsk where the listening devices were located. One of the vessels was equipped with deep-sea equipment. As American intelligence later established, both devices were raised from the bottom. Moreover, the Soviet side had no doubts who they belonged to, since one of them was found with a sign "Property of the US government."

But why did this happen? Did the unsuccessful actions of Sivulf really lead to the failure of Operation Bindweed in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk? The US Naval Intelligence Agency has carefully analyzed all available information on this issue. As a result, a top-secret report was drawn up, access to which was extremely limited. It excluded the possibility of mere coincidence or chance on the part of the Russians: they knew what they were doing and went exactly to the location of the recording device. The version of involvement in his discovery of the submarine "Sivulf" was also excluded. She fell on the cable at a time when the Soviet ship with deep-sea equipment had long been heading to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. Consequently, it was concluded that the most likely reason for the failure of the operation is information leakage, that is, in certain US military-political circles admitted to this topic, there is a Soviet agent. But who is he, the Americans could not establish for four years, until 1985. However, this will be discussed below.

At the same time, there is another version of the failure of the Bindweed operation in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. According to the command of the Pacific Fleet, the primary reason for the discovery of the American "cocoon" was an accidental breakage of the cable by a trawl when Soviet ships were fishing in that area. A special cable ship was sent to the supposed place of cable damage, which, while searching for a break in the cable, found a large container of unknown purpose at the bottom. The container was lifted on board the ship, and then delivered to the base and forwarded further to Moscow to determine its purpose and ownership. KGB and Navy experts gave an unequivocal conclusion: the found container is a high-tech automated listening device made in the USA40.

In which of the proposed versions lies the truth, it is not possible to say in this book. The special services of both the United States and the USSR have always kept their secrets extremely carefully, especially if it was connected with the activities of undercover intelligence.

But be that as it may, the Soviet leadership became aware of wiretapping of communications on a submarine cable communication line that was considered inaccessible. Based on this, the American command at that time was faced with a dilemma: if the "Bindweed" operation in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk failed, does this mean that a listening device on a Soviet cable was also found in the Barents Sea. Is it possible to send the submarine "Perch" to pick up intelligence information to the coast of the Kola Peninsula?

From the "gold mine" do not refuse

Despite the huge risk, the command of the US Navy could not refuse such a super-valuable source of information as an underwater communication line in the Barents Sea - the region where the most powerful group of sea-based strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union operated. The decision was made: "Purch" will be sent to remove information from the listening device. However, it was necessary to take extraordinary precautions to completely exclude its detection.

The specified area was constantly monitored by all components of the intelligence system of the US Armed Forces. However, nothing unusual was noted in the activities of the forces of the Northern Fleet during this period. But perhaps, given the intensive shipping in this area, unlike the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, the opposing side, under its cover, has already managed to organize some kind of countermeasures? With this in mind, the idea arose to send the Purch to the destination area by a completely unthinkable route. One that the opposing side can never imagine. And such an unusual route was chosen. It provided that the submarine would follow the Pacific coast of the United States, cross the equator, pass along South America, go around Cape Horn and the Falkland Islands from the south, cross the entire Atlantic and enter the Barents Sea from the southwest. The departure from the base point was scheduled for April 1982, it was assumed that the duration of the campaign would be about five months, and the distance traveled was about 15,000 miles.

When in the destination area, the submarine, in the interests of secrecy, reduced the time spent above the cable to the limit. A "cocoon" of a new modification was installed, which has a self-destruction device in case it rises to the surface. It also provided for an increased capacity of recording equipment, since it was assumed in advance that Purch would be able to return to read information the next time only after two years due to the need to put it in for repairs.

For this campaign, which ended successfully, the crew of the submarine was awarded thanks in the decree of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces - the President of the United States. In the personal certificate, which was awarded to each member of the crew, in addition to the traditional phrases already mentioned earlier, "outstanding achievements in the duration and efficiency of underwater operations" were noted. In addition, President Reagan personally presented the submarine commander with a box of cigars in honor of the success of this mission.

It so happened that in 1983, not a single submarine from the US Navy could be sent to the Barents Sea to read information from a listening device. "Purch" was under repair for a year. The Seawolf was also in the dock, recovering from the damage she received on her last cruise. Based on the previous results, it was decided not to use it any more according to the "Bindweed" operation plan, but to limit itself only to attracting sunken fragments of rocket weapons and equipment from the seabed. Taking into account the current situation, the command of the US Navy planned to re-equip the fourth submarine for special operations. The nuclear multi-purpose submarine "Richard Russell" of the "Sturgeon" type became it.

After repairs were completed in 1984, the Pörch submarine made its fifth voyage to the Barents Sea. Since then, there have been significant changes in the military-political situation in the world, in the top military-political leadership of the USSR and its military doctrine. Therefore, the information that the Purch delivered after returning earned a very flattering assessment in the National Security Agency and the Naval Intelligence Agency. In particular, it contained information about the control system of Soviet strategic missile submarines, the degree of their combat readiness, views on their use in various conditions of the situation. American leaders received very valuable information for them that submarine missile carriers are not planned to be used as a means of delivering a first nuclear missile strike, but are intended to be used as a strategic reserve. Information was also received about the organization of so-called "protected areas" of combat operations ("bastions") of missile submarines and other very interesting information.

Traitors in the "slender" ranks

At the beginning of 1985, the intelligence department of the US Navy received a message from the FBI, which could seriously affect the possibility of further reconnaissance operations by American submarines in the coastal waters of the USSR, including listening to cable communication lines.

The FBI has determined that Walker, a former liaison officer at the Atlantic Submarine Command Headquarters, is a Soviet agent. Starting in 1968, he transferred to the KGB of the USSR information about encryption technology and information coding systems, photocopies of secret documents and cipher materials of the headquarters of the submarine forces in Norfolk. In particular, as naval intelligence experts determined, it was thanks to this information that the Soviet command in many cases knew exactly where American submarines were patrolling. Also, thanks to Walker, the latest American technical achievements were used on Soviet boats to reduce their noise. The leadership of the US Navy was rather dismayed by the paradoxical situation that the Soviets, having spent a total of only about a million dollars on the payment of one of their agents, were thereby able to almost nullify the advantages of the US in the confrontation under water, which they had been trying to win for decades. And this despite the billions spent on research, development, successful intelligence operations, including listening to communication lines, risking hundreds of lives of American sailors.

Those gloomy assumptions that were expressed by intelligence experts in the late 1970s and early 1980s about the presence of Soviet agents in the highest governing bodies of the American armed forces came true.

Even more stunning news came to the Navy intelligence at the end of the same year: an employee of the US National Security Agency Pelton was arrested, who, as established by the FBI, handed over to the Soviet side a large amount of classified materials, including on Operation Bindweed. Pelton sold information to the KGB about tapping a submarine cable line off the coast of Kamchatka for $35,000. Much has now become clear to the American military command from the unclear situation that developed in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk in 1981. However, an investigation by the Naval Intelligence Agency showed that Pelton did not have access to data on the activities of American submarines under the Operation Bindweed plan in the Barents Sea, much less in other areas of the World Ocean41.

Here we should pay special attention to the fate of Pelton, who played a fatal role in this reconnaissance operation, which continued so successfully for a number of years.

Ronald Pelton was an NSA staff member from 1964 to 1979. As a specialist who was fluent in Russian, he worked in one of the departments of the agency, which was engaged in deciphering recordings of conversations between Soviet military and civilian officials intercepted using electronic intelligence. In the last years of his work at the agency, Pelton often had to listen to tapes of a completely new nature. As he suggested, they were received by connecting to some kind of wire communication line of Russians in the Far East, since the negotiations concerned exclusively the peninsula with the Indian-like name Kamchatka. Apparently, conversations were also carried out on the same cable using classified communication equipment, because Pelton happened to translate the open technical exchange of operators before they turned on special scramblers. Remarkably, Kamchatka films were received every 3-4 months, and then a huge wave of information for translation literally overwhelmed the employees of his department.

In the meantime, Pelton was engaged in this work along with other responsible tasks, without attaching any special importance to it. He had not yet guessed that later acquaintance with her would literally make him rich. This continued until 1979, when Pelton failed his annual polygraph test - a "lie detector". Previously, he always carefully prepared for them, but this time it was organized unexpectedly. It revealed his homosexual inclinations, and such employees were not kept in the agency. Pelton had to quit, but he harbored a sense of revenge on the organization, which, instantly forgetting his merits, threw him out into the street without a livelihood.

Out of a sense of revenge and, apparently, for financial reasons, Pelton decided to apply to the Soviet embassy, ​​where he offered his services as a former NSA employee who had access to top-secret information and also remained well connected in this organization. For almost six years before his arrest in November 1985, he provided Soviet intelligence with detailed information about the activities and elements of the NSA security system in the seventies. Pelton released information about several strategically important US electronic intelligence gathering systems, including the one for Operation Bindweed. He passed on all the information that was related to listening to the "Kamchatka" tapes that he remembered so well, and also supplemented it with his conclusion: American intelligence is listening to some kind of cable communication line in the Far East and, possibly, deciphering messages transmitted through it. It must be assumed that it was not difficult for Soviet intelligence to establish what kind of communication line this was. But in carrying out measures to prevent further leakage of information, the Soviet side had to provide for an operation to cover Pelton. The Americans should not have guessed in any case from what source the data on Operation Bindweed was obtained. Perhaps one of the activities to cover up Pelton was the spread of rumors, and subsequently the publication in the Soviet press of information about the breakage of the communication cable in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk by fishermen and about the "accidental discovery" of an American listening device there?

The American side during this period was busy with other things.

The military-political leadership of the US armed forces was very concerned about the possibility of further leakage of information on this operation at the Pelton trial and through the media. Unprecedented pressure was put on Pelton himself, judges, lawyers, owners of publishing houses and magazines to prevent this. So, when Pelton's lawyer only mentioned the code name "Ivy Bells" at one of the closed court hearings, the judge stopped the interrogation, prohibiting further consideration of the case. CIA director Casey repeatedly threatened the owners of a number of American newspapers with prosecution for disclosing state secrets if information about this operation was published. The owner of one of the most popular American newspapers, the Washington Post, was personally called by US President Reagan with an urgent request not to publish an article about Pelton in it, as this "could damage the national security of the country"42.

Replaced by "Manta"

Given the events that have taken place in the National Security Agency and the US Navy, emergency measures have been taken to tighten the secrecy regime. The codename "Bindweed" ("Ivy Bells") will never be used again, the term "Manta" began to be used to refer to submarine reconnaissance operations in general, and "Acetone" to eavesdrop on submarine cable communication lines. But these conditional names subsequently began to change several times.

In an atmosphere of unusually high secrecy and with comprehensive precautions, the submarine "Purch" was sent back to the Barents Sea at the beginning of September 1986 by the Arctic route. This was the seventh boat trip to this region. However, when the submarine was almost on the border of the 12-mile territorial waters of the Soviet Union, a cipher telegram suddenly arrived from Washington, forbidding her to enter these waters and instructing her to wait for further instructions. The fact is that on September 19, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze handed over a letter from Gorbachev to US President Reagan with a proposal to hold a summit meeting to discuss issues of strategic arms limitation. And such a meeting between the two leaders was scheduled for October 11, 1986. Naturally, under such conditions, the military-political leadership of the United States in no way wanted to complicate relations with the USSR in any way literally on the eve of this meeting. If the submarine "Purch" was discovered in the territorial waters of the Soviet Union, this would inevitably happen.

For about a month, the submarine was in the waiting area near the point of the main mission, without entering the territorial waters. Over such a long time, the risk of being detected increased immeasurably. The crew members, who had all the information about the true mission of the submarine, clearly imagined the danger of the current situation. If the boat is discovered while entering Soviet territorial waters, it will inevitably be either destroyed by the enemy, or, if it is threatened with capture, blown up by the American crew itself. But in all cases, the American leadership will completely deny its involvement in what happened.

Like a soldier in a trench before the decisive moment of the attack, the nuclear submarine "Purch" froze at the border of the territorial waters of the USSR in the Barents Sea, waiting for a short command "Forward!" To pick up the "cocoon" and perform the necessary operations on the secret Soviet communication cable. The last days before the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting in Reykjavik were running out, and any mistake in the actions of Purch could lead to a breakdown in negotiations between them.

But finally, the submarine received a signal allowing it to enter the territorial waters. Divers from the Purch replaced one of the eavesdropping devices and retrieved the tapes from the other. The task was completed, the corresponding signals were transmitted to the supporting nuclear submarine "Finback" and to Washington. After returning to the base, the crew of the "Purch" was noted in the next decree of the President of the United States. Given the extraordinary circumstances in which this campaign was carried out and the task was brilliantly accomplished, President Reagan wished to meet personally with the commander of the submarine, Buchanan, and express gratitude to him for his significant contribution to strengthening US national security.

In 1987, the Seawolf submarine was decommissioned by the Navy, and the Purch got up for conversion to a dock, during which it was supposed to additionally insert a 30-meter section into its hull with advanced equipment for servicing listening devices and lifting sunken equipment. Within a few years, while the refitting of the Purch lasted, she was to be replaced by the nuclear submarine Richard Russell. She has repeatedly, since 1987, made trips to the Barents Sea both under US President Reagan and under President Bush. She was also on a secret mission in the northern Norwegian Sea when President Bush offered to help Gorbachev raise the sunken Soviet nuclear submarine Komsomolets. She continued her intelligence activities under President Clinton until 1993, until she was withdrawn from combat.

From that moment on, it was replaced by the re-equipped nuclear submarine Purch, which in 1995, 1996 and 1997 was again awarded the US President for the successful completion of special tasks. At the same time, the most modern underwater technologies were used for their implementation, including remotely controlled robotic long-range vehicles, which practically minimized the risk of human lives. After 2002, it is to be replaced by the Jimmy Carter nuclear submarine, the third Seawolf-class submarine. Unlike previous submarines of the series, the Jimmy Carter boat is supposed to install an additional section of a two-hull structure (the so-called "wasp waist") 14 meters long. The solid building will house premises for Navy and NSA electronic intelligence specialists or for special operations forces personnel. The space between the hulls will serve to accommodate various reconnaissance equipment, including those designed to listen to underwater cable communication lines, advanced delivery vehicles for combat swimmers, equipment for lifting sunken objects, etc.

In the early 1990s, with a radical change in the geopolitical situation in the world and the adoption of new military-doctrinal guidelines, the United States began to expand the intelligence activities of its submarines to other regions of the oceans, where, as they believe, their "vital" interests may be affected. The coastal waters of Iran, China, North Korea, the countries of the Arab world (especially Iraq and Libya) became the zones of their close attention. It is quite obvious that during such reconnaissance operations, it was not possible to do without listening to the submarine cable communication lines of these, and perhaps other states. Thus, it has been reliably established that in 1985 the nuclear submarine "Sivulf", together with the ultra-small submarine of special construction NR-1, carried out a reconnaissance operation in the Mediterranean Sea to listen to Libyan submarine communications cables.

The pathological desire of the military-political leadership of the United States to keep under close control any objectionable, and in some cases even pleasing governments of other states of the world leaves no doubt about its constancy. This is confirmed by the grandiose projects of the US Armed Forces command to connect listening devices with coastal terminals in Japan and Greenland using long-distance fiber-optic cables in order to receive intelligence information not by periodically picking it up by submarines, but practically in real time. With the successful functioning of one of these projects, it was supposed to extend this practice to other regions of the World Ocean that were of interest to the American side. However, due to the significant costs of their implementation (more than a billion dollars), the US Congress did not approve these projects. But over the past decades, scientific thought and production have made great strides forward. At present, and in a certain perspective, practically any coastal state in the world has no guarantee that no less grandiose, but technically more advanced and less expensive American intelligence projects have already been implemented or can be implemented in their territorial waters.

E A Baikov, G L Zykov

From the book "Secrets of Underwater Espionage"

Every day we see thousands of signs and symbols. And we even use some of them to express the strongest feelings when we can’t find words. But have you ever wondered where they came from? And are we using them correctly?

We decided to understand this in detail and collected for you the 7 most famous symbols, the meaning and origin of which is not known to everyone.

Ampersand (sign &)

The ampersand sign (&) denotes the Latin union et (or English and), that is, "and". Such a ligature was invented in ancient Rome. Tyro, who was Cicero's private secretary, invented his own system of abbreviations to speed up writing, called "Tyronian signs."

Subsequently, this sign took root in Europe and America so much that for a long time it was in last place in the English alphabet, and began to disappear only by the beginning of the 20th century. The word "ampersand" itself is an abbreviation of the phrase And per se and. When the letters of the alphabet were pronounced to the children, after z the teacher said: And per se and - “And in itself“ and ”. Before the letter, coinciding in pronunciation with the word, they said per se (“by itself”, “as such”).

Over time, from the letters et, the shape of the symbol changed to such an extent that such a sign arose.

Heart

But here everything is more complicated. Despite the fact that “love lives in the heart,” everyone knows that the heart symbol does not have much in common with a real heart. But there are several hypotheses about its origin.

• A pair of swans swimming towards each other forms the shape of a heart at the moment of contact. In the cultures of many peoples, these birds are a symbol of love, fidelity and devotion, as the formed couple remains together for life.


• Another hypothesis says that the sign was originally a symbol of the feminine. He himself depicts the shape of the female pelvis. The ancient Greeks even built a special temple to Aphrodite. It is unique because it was the only temple in the whole world that worshiped the buttocks. No, yes, that's it.


• There is also a version that this sign is the shape of an ivy leaf. On the vase of the Greeks, he was usually depicted together with Dionysus, the god of winemaking, the patron saint of passion.

Bluetooth

In the 10th century, King Harald Blatand ruled in Denmark, who united the Danish tribes into a single kingdom. Harald was also nicknamed Bluetooth, as he was a famous blueberry lover and at least one of his teeth was permanently dyed blue.

Bluetooth technology (from the English "blue tooth") is designed to combine several devices into one network. And the sign of technology is a combination of two Scandinavian runes: "hagal" or "hagalaz" (Hagall) - an analogue of the Latin H, and "berkana" (Berkana) - Latin B, which corresponds to the first letters of the name Harald Blatand. By the way, the first devices, as you might guess, were blue in color and looked like a tooth.

Medicine symbol

Few people know, but the symbol of medicine, depicting a cane with wings and two snakes, is actually a mistake.

According to legend, Hermes (the Romans - Mercury) had a magic wand caduceus, which looked exactly like this. Caduceus had the ability to stop any disputes and reconcile enemies, but had nothing to do with medicine.

The fact is that more than 100 years ago, US military doctors confused it with the staff of Asclepius, which had no wings and only one snake. Asclepius was the ancient Greek god of healing and medicine, so the mistake is understandable. Subsequently, this sign took root and is now used as a symbol of medical secrecy.

Sign "Power" (Power)

The “Power” or Power sign can be found on almost any device, but few people know where it came from.

Back in the 1940s, engineers used the binary system to refer to individual switches, with 1 meaning "on" and 0 meaning "off." Subsequently, this was transformed into a sign in the form of a circle, that is, zero and sticks - units.

A symbol of peace

The Pacific, or, as it is also called, the sign of peace, was invented in 1958 for a protest demonstration against the use of nuclear weapons. The peace sign is a combination of semaphore signals N and D, which means "nuclear disarmament" (English nuclear disarmament).